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1.1 Summary of the Issue
The current closure of Department of Defense bases and facilities in the United
States results from two basic policies currently in favor with the executive and legislative
branches of the government. The first and most important policy is the desire to reduce
the expenses of the Department of Defense, which has a significant affect on the overall
budget of the United States. The second policy results from the desire to develop and
coordinate an organized approach to determining and providing for our overall defense
needs. This policy is based on evaluation of what is called the "Force -Structure Plan,"
which is the overall strategy for determining how many forces of which types, placed
where, are needed to protect the national security interests of the United States.
The history, insight into the mechanics of the process and the implementation
requirements of this public policy to close military installations is relevant to a
specialized group of military and civilian civil engineers in Federal service for two
reasons. First, these engineers, who are responsible for the planning, construction and
maintenance of Federal Defense installations nationwide, are the professionals who must
develop, provide and defend the technical data used for evaluation during the closure
process. They need to understand the process, what the intention of Congress is and
how their involvement can affect the outcome. Secondly, once a facility has been
selected for closure, it is the engineers who are technically (and often administratively)
responsible for carrying out the implementation requirements of the process until final
closure of the installation. Therefore, they must know what is required by the law in
order to carry out the closure properly.

In studying base closures and realignments from the 1980's until the present, this
paper will investigate the positive and negative aspects of this process as it has been
legislated by Congress and implemented by the Department of Defense. It is the
purpose of this paper to evaluate the base closure process and implementation measures
while commenting on how appropriate and effective they are in regards to achieving: (1)
the goals of Congress, (2) the savings and efficiencies sought by the Department of
Defense, and (3) the minimization of impacts felt by the surrounding civilian
communities and the affected federal civilian personnel.
This investigation will be based on: (1) a brief review of the base closure process
prior to the late 1980's, (2) a study of the 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission on Base
Realignment and Closure, and (3) an analysis of the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990. A case study will be utilized to summarize the 1990 process.
1.2 Political History
Since the early 1980's, the executive branch of the United States government has
sought to reduce the growing national deficit and debt by various means. (In 1980, the
first year of the Reagan Administration, the deficit was 60 billion dollars and the debt
was 914 billion dollars compared to an estimated 1992 deficit of 365 billion dollars and a
debt of 4.1 trillion dollars.) (1:314 & 2:358) One of the early policy initiatives
undertaken by President Reagan, was to dispose of surplus federal real property by sale
with the proceeds to be used to help retire the national debt. The proposed bill was
entitled the "National Debt Retirement Act of 1982." (3:1) Other actions included the
creation of the Property Management Initiative and issuance of Executive Order 12348,
which established the Property Review Board, whose purpose was to facilitate the
identification and speedy disposal of surplus federal properties. (4:4)

As the executive branch sought to curtail further government spending and to
economize were possible, the Secretary of Defense revisited the old problem of base
closures. He sought to find a way to pay for the significant one-time costs of closing
bases, while avoiding some of the time consuming regulations required in the process.
Secretary Carlucci worked with Congress to enact a one-time law that would achieve his
objectives while ensuring that Congress had the ultimate approval authority of the
recommendations.
Congress, in 1988, through enactment of Public Law 100-526, the Defense
Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, gave the Department
of Defense the authorization to study and make base closure recommendations. At the
same time, Congress retained control over the Department's actions in order to prevent
sudden and unplanned base closures that historically have had significant negative
affects on the communities in which they are based. This act was a progressive policy
change from earlier Congressional mandates spelled out in Section 2687, Title 10, U. S.
Code, that restricted the actions of the Secretary of Defense in closing bases. (5:5-12)
From the lessons learned in the 1988 process, and since the world situation had
changed dramatically in 1989 and 1990, the Department of Defense sought to further
review the need for all of its facilities. In cooperation with Congress, they developed a
revised method to evaluate bases for possible closure while trying to minimize the impact
to the local communities. These efforts resulted in the development and passage of




The choice of which bases to close has always been controversial and often
somewhat subjective. In the 1970's, when many bases were closed after the Vietnam
Era, the Secretary of Defense made choices based on strategic needs as he saw them.
His choices did not necessarily consider the total aspect of military bases and the
interaction with the local economies that supported and were supported by them. This
early policy upset Congress and eventually brought about Congressional control of the
process after several communities were economically devastated by the sudden base
closures. (An example of this occurred to the town of North Kingston, Rhode Island
when Naval Air Station Quonset Point was closed in 1973.)
Because of the previous apparent subjectivity of the choices for base closure, the
1988 Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act,
established criteria for evaluating all bases. This process made a preliminary screening
for conformarfce with the force-structure requirements and then utilized a follow-up
detailed analysis to evaluate possible closure candidates. These closure candidates were
then compiled by the Commission for presentation to the Secretary of Defense and
subsequently to the President and Congress.
This process changed somewhat in 1990 with Public Law 101-510. With this law,
the Secretary collected data and made recommendations to an independent Commission,
who then modified it as necessary with input from the General Accounting Office. The
Commission then presented the list to the President, and ultimately to Congress, who
could either accept or reject the recommendations in their entirety, without the ability to
make changes to individual bases. This last step prevented the obvious problems of
having every » Congressman trying to get "their" base off the list and ultimately
deadlocking the whole process. (6:160)

1.4 Implementation
Once the bases had been chosen for closure and approved, then the process to
physically cease operations and prepare the facility for reduced operations, caretaker
status or disposal began. Based on the previous experiences of how bases were
improperly closed in the 1960's and 1970's, which often caused significant detrimental
effects to their surrounding communities, Congress decided to add to Public Law 101-
510 steps that the military departments must take to close their facilities in order to
minimize the impact on adjacent communities. This whole area of implementation of
base closures, will be a specific area of interest presented in this paper, specifically on




During the 1960's, the Kennedy Administration implemented the most extensive
base closure and realignment program in American history. Hundreds of closures and
realignments occurred with more than 60 major bases involved. Most of these actions
were undertaken without Congressional interaction and when they occurred, Congress
was unprepared for the economic and political consequences that resulted.
Determined not to let this happen again, Congress prepared legislation that would
control the actions of the Department of Defense regarding base closures; however, it
was vetoed by President Johnson. Base closures continued throughout the 1960's but
during the 1970's the Department found it harder and harder to close facilities due to
increased friction between the executive and legislative branches and Congress's
restriction of funds to carry out these closures. Again, Congress enacted legislation that
would control the process, but President Ford vetoed the legislation and the
congressional veto override failed.
However, in 1977, President Carter finally gave Congress what it was seeking in
this area, by approving legislation that listed several steps the Department of Defense
had to comply with in order to close a base. This legislation became Section 2687, Title
10, U. S. Code. Previously, in 1969, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
came into being. One of the significant provisions of this act required Environmental
Impact Statements (EIS) on all projects that contained federal funding. These statements
required the activity making the change to address what effects the proposed project
would have on the community over a range of areas from environmental concerns to
economic ones.

Together these two actions effectively brought a halt to base closures and realignments
because of the inability of the military departments to meet all of the regulatory
requirements while trying to resolve the political consequences of the closures in any
kind of timely. manner. (7:167-168)

CHAPTER 3
THE 1988 DEFENSE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON
BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE
3.1 History
In the late 1980's, Secretary of Defense Carlucci realized that some headway must
be made in the political stalemate regarding base closures. He knew that significant
amounts of money could be saved that would help with the national budget problems,
while at the same time ensuring that defense readiness was maintained, if some form of
change could be made. But the current laws so restricted the military departments and
offered no funding to cover the one-time costs of closing bases, that no base closure
actions proved successful for many years. Therefore, he sought out and worked with
Congress to enact a one-time Base Closure Commission under Public Law 100-526, to
study and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.
Under this legislation, the Commission was relieved from the time consuming
National Environmental Policy Act requirements of preparing an Environmental Impact
Statement during their review phase. This action alone allowed what normally took 18
to 24 months to do, to be carried out in only 7.
Additionally, a Base Closure Account was established and funded to pay for
economic adjustment assistance, community planning assistance and for the one-time
base closure costs, rather than making the military departments give up operating and
maintenance funds for this purpose. This last item had always been a negative incentive
to the services to close bases in the past, and this new separately funded account would
now alleviate that problem. (7:168-169)

3.2 Criteria
The Charter for the Commission contained nine factors that would be used as a
minimum for evaluation of all bases. They were:
a. The current and future mission requirements;
b. The availability and condition of land and facilities;
c. Contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements;
d. Cost and personnel implications;
e. Extent and timing of savings, including whether the cost savings
from the closing will exceed the cost of realignment within
six years from the date of the closure;
f. Economic impact on the community;
g. Community support;
h. Environmental impact; and
i. Implementation process.
The Commission decided to use a two-step process in their evaluation of the
bases. In the first step, they divided the bases into task forces and functional categories,
had the military departments develop criteria for evaluation of each category, and then
assigned weights to each criteria. Table 3-1 outlines these task forces and categories.
(8:411) In the second step, they conducted a detailed analysis of those facilities with the
lowest rankings in their respective functional category. The Commission also determined
where excess capacity existed by category prior to ranking the more than 4,200 domestic
defense properties. From this overall process the Commission determined which
facilities could be closed and which could be realigned. (9:4)
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Seven months later, in December of 1988, the Commission issued its report
calling for the closing of 86 facilities and the realigning of 54 more with an estimated
annual savings of $700 million. While the force-structure was estimated to remain stable
for the next 5 years, the Commission was recommending the closure of approximately 3
percent of the domestic bases. (7:168-169) Of the affected 145 military installations,
only six Navy facilities were slated for closure and six for realignment. This brought
sharp criticism from at least one Committee member who felt that the Navy had not
cooperated fully with the Commission and suggested that they should be looked at more
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closely if this process occurred again, irregardless of the administration's 600-ship
policy. Table 3-2 lists the affected Navy facilities from the Commission's report.
(10:2-4)
Table 3-2 Navy Facilities On the Base Closure and Realignment Report
FACILITY ACTION 20 YR SAVINGS
Hunters Point Naval Station, CA Close $ 83,600,000
Lake Charles Naval Station, LA Close $ 17,500,000
Brooklyn Naval Station, NY Close $ 42,320,000
Philadelphia Hospital, PA Close *
Galveston Naval Station, TX Close $ 34,100,000
Sand Point Naval Station, WA Close $ 22,420,000
Long Beach Naval Station, CA Realign
San Diego Naval Station, CA Realign
Pearl Harbor Naval Station, HI Realign
Staten Island Naval Station, NY Realign
Ingleside Naval Station, TX Realign
Everett Naval Station, WA Realign
* Report did not publish savings for this facility (10:2-4)
3.4 Politics
Public Law 100-526, known as the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base
Closure and Realignment Act, built in an automatic approval process to the Secretary of
Defense's recommendations unless a joint resolution disapproving the recommendation
was enacted within 45 days from March 1, 1989. (5:5) Additionally, the act provided
that Congress must disapprove of the recommendations as a whole in order to prevent
11

them from approving some and rejecting others. On February 22, and March 1, 1989,
hearings before the Military Installations and Facilities Subcommittee of the Committee
on Armed Services House of Representatives were held. Significant testimony was heard
supporting and condemning the Commission's report.
On March 1, 1989, House Joint Resolution 165 was introduced to disapprove of
the Secretary's recommendations. After consideration of the testimony at the hearings
and finding that no serious misconduct had occurred at the hands of the Commission,
the Committee on Armed Services recommended that the joint resolution be rejected,
which it was, allowing the Commission's recommendations to became law in May of
1989. (9:1-8)
3.5 Implementation
The closures listed in Table 3-2 are currently being implemented and are
scheduled to be complete by October of 1995. The current figures indicate that the
Department of Defense will realize an implementation savings of over $500 million with




DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990
4.1 History
In the two years following the 1988 Commission's Report, the world situation
changed dramatically from the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact to the beginning of the break-up of the Soviet Union. This change in
world military power brought America face to face with the realization that it no longer
needed the size and structure of the military force it then had or had planned for in
1988. Additionally, the current crisis in the Persian Gulf was showing us that our
military forces were not as mobile or as deployable as we had thought they were.
Because of these changes and realizations, the Secretary of Defense foresaw the need to
reshape our force-structure from that of a strategic one to a smaller conventional one
with the capability of rapidly responding to areas of developing regional conflicts.
Also at this time, the controversies over budget problems, the debt, and the
deficit were paralyzing Congress. The Secretary of Defense felt that more savings could
be obtained from closing and realigning bases since the size of the American military
establishment was shrinking, meaning fewer personnel, less training, and obviously fewer
facilities. Since the 1988 Commission was a one-time entity, the Secretary began the
long and tedious process of closing bases under the Section 2687 procedure. In January
of 1990, he announced his list of candidates for closure which began the 1 to 2 year
period of required study.
Congress, feeling the economic and political pressure of the Nation, was also
trying to find budget savings wherever reasonable, especially in the area of defense.
They began a process with the Defense Department to draw up legislation that would
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overcome the regulatory roadblocks placed before the Secretary in the base closure
process. Based on the successes and failures of the 1988 Commission, Congress and the
President, developed a better base closure evaluation and implementation process which
was signed into law as Public Law 101-510 on November 5, 1990. It was officially
called Title XXIX - Defense Base Closures and Realignments, but became more
commonly known as the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. (7:170)
4.2 Differences from the 1988 Process
There were many lessons Congress learned from the 1988 process that they
sought to correct with this new law. The first was that the process should be open to
the public and not be secretive. (9:5) Before, the Commission had met in closed
chambers for "national security" reasons and no one knew of their recommendations until
they were announced in December, 1988. This time, Congress mandated that the
Commission hold their meetings in public, except for those specifically discussing
classified material, conduct public hearings once the Secretary of Defense reported his
recommendations, and be available to certain Congressional members for oversight
purposes. (7:127-128)
The second major difference, related to the Commission working with the
General Accounting Office. During the hearings after the 1988 Commission reported its
findings, numerous politicians and local action groups inundated the Congress with
information contradicting some of the Commission's findings and cost data. Without an
independent agency looking over the Commission's procedures there was no satisfactory
way to know who was right and who was wrong.
Therefore, the new law established that the General Accounting Office would
work closely with the Department of Defense personnel who prepared the supporting
14

data for the Commission. After the Secretary of Defense released his recommendations
to the Commission, the General Accounting Office would have one month to review the
report and issue their findings relative to what the Defense Department was
recommendingi (11:2 & 7)
One of the more structurally different items between the two Commissions was
how they were made up and who reported to whom. The 1988 Commission was selected
by the Secretary of Defense and reported to him, who in turn reported to the President
and then to Congress. However, Congress had felt that there was a lack of
independence in this approach. In the new legislation, they mandated that the President
choose the Commission members with the approval of the Senate. Additionally, they
established that the Secretary of Defense should make his recommendations to the
Commission, who could make changes to it, if appropriate, and then the Commission
would report to the President and subsequently to Congress. (11:5)
Another difference was that of selecting the evaluation criteria. In 1988, the
Department of Defense together with Congress choose the criteria. Congress now
required that the Defense Department establish their own criteria and then put them out
for public comment prior to use in the evaluation process. (7:129)
Additionally, Congress made this a multi-year process to be repeated in 1993 and
1995. This changed the one-time only attitude that the 1988 Commission faced and
allowed for continued improvements in the base closure process. Tied in with this
multi-year approach was the requirement for the Department of Defense to develop and
present its force -structure plan every two years with a six year forecast for the military
departments. A sort of rolling review and modification process. (7:129-130)
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One final significant difference was that Congress decided to include
environmental clean-up costs in the Base Closure Account rather than relying only on
the Environmental Restoration Account. This decision was made to prevent unnecessary
delays in clean-up and in property disposal which would affect the timing of the costs
recouped from their sale. (6:169)
4.3 Force -Structure Plan
Paragraph (a) of Section 2903 of Part A of Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510
prescribed that:
(1) As part of the budget justification documents
submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the
Department of Defense for each of the fiscal years 1992,
1994, and 1996, the Secretary shall include a force-
structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an
assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the
national security during the six- year period beginning with
the fiscal year for which the budget request is made and of
the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for
national defense purposes during such period.
(2) Such plan shall include, without any reference (directly
or indirectly) to military installations inside the United
States that may be closed or realigned under such plan -
(A) a description of the assessment referred to in
paragraph (1);
(B) a description (i) of the anticipated force
structure during and at the end of each such period
for each military department, and (ii) of the units
that will need to be forward based during and at
the end of each such period; and
(C) a description of the anticipated
implementation of such force -structure plan.
(11:129)
This was the Congressional mandate to the Department of Defense to determine
where it was going over the next six years and what forces it would need to get there.
This force-structure plan would then be a comparison tool for Congress to see if the
16

requested base closures and realignments made sense with what the Department said it
was trying to achieve. This action was a significant difference from the 1988
Commission process which required no such plan, and a lesson learned from the
subsequent hearings held after the 1988 report was issued when the lack of a plan made
it difficult for Congress to understand the Defense Department's justifications. (11:129)
The Department then made a detailed study of the perceived world threats and
issued a classified SECRET report to Congress. The unclassified summary of the plan
and report indicate less of a global threat and more of a regional conflict scenario as
experienced in the Persian Gulf with Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Based on
these threat assessments and the United States strategy for dealing with them, the
strategic forces will be scaled back and the conventional forces will be restructured to




Table 4-1 Force -Structure Changes FY 90 - FY 95
FORCES FY 90 FY 93 FY 95
ARMY DIVISIONS
Active 18 14 12
Reserve 10 08 06
MARINE CORPS DIVISIONS
.Active 03 03 03
Reserve 01 01 01
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 13 13 12
CARRIER AIR WINGS
Active 13 11 11
Reserve 02 02 02
BATTLE FORCE SHIPS 545 464 451
TACTICAL FIGHTER WINGS
Active 24 16 15
Reserve 12 12 11
STRATEGIC BOMBERS 268 171 181
PERSONNEL (000) FY 90 FY 93 FY 95
ACTIVE DUTY
Army 751 618 536
Navy 583 536 510
Marine Corps 197 182 171
Air Force 539 458 437
TOTAL 2,070 1,794 1,645
RESERVES 1,128 989 906
CIVILIANS 1,073 976 940
(7:15 -22)
In summary, by the end of fiscal year 1995, as compared with fiscal year 1990,
the Navy will have 94 fewer battle force ships, one less aircraft carrier and two less
carrier air wings. The Air Force will have 10 less tactical fighter wings and the Army




In general, the Congress felt that the criteria for this evolution should be selected
by the Department of Defense. They felt that the public and Congress should have the
opportunity to comment on the proposed criteria and, once the comments had been
received, the Secretary should publish the final criteria. This is the procedure that was
followed. (11:129)
The proposed criteria for the 1990 process differed from those used in the 1988
process in two significant manners. First, the 1988 Commission gave a priority in their
analysis to military value of bases and recommended for any follow-on reviews that
other criteria such as community and environmental impact be evaluated with similar
emphasis. Second, the first Commission felt that the six year "payback" period was too
short and should be extended which might still show significant savings up to the 20
year point. The Department of Defense agreed with these comments and changed their
proposed criteria to reflect these concerns. (7:23)
On November 23, 1990, the Department published in the Federal Register their
proposed criteria, which generally followed the criteria used by the 1988 Commission,
and sought public comment by December 31, 1990. However, they extended the
comment period to January 24, 1991, in order to allow for the maximum amount of
comment. There were 169 public comments received and these were grouped into four
categories:
a) general comments,
b) military value comments,




All comments were evaluated, changes were made to the proposed criteria, and
on February 15, 1991, the comments and the final criteria were published in the Federal
Register . Table 4-2 is a list of these criteria. (12:4-13)
Table 4-2 Final Criteria
In selecting military installations for closure or realignment, the
Department of Defense, giving priority consideration to military value (the first
four criteria below), will consider:
MILITARY VALUE
1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on
operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at
both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total
force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications,
RETURN ON INVESTMENT
5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the
number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or
realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
IMPACTS
6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities'
infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.
(12:4-13)
4.5 Navy Process Overview
For their part, the Department of the Navy analyzed their installations in the
United States through a process of evaluating the shore activities in relation to the Navy
20

force -structure plan by categories. Under the Navy's review committee, called the Base
Structure Committee, chaired by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and
Environment), these categories were formulated to account for mission differences,
facility requirements, geographic factors and operational necessities within the Navy's
area of responsibility. All facilities were examined including those which the 1988
Commission recommended either for realignment or as receiving locations for other
displaced units.
Initially, analysis of capacity within each category was performed to determine if
the potential existed for closure or realignment of facilities that primarily supported that
category. Then alternative planning scenarios were evaluated and, lastly, the Department
of Defense final selection criteria were applied. (13:5-8)
4.6 Navy Categories
One of the lessons learned from the 1988 Commission was that Congress would
want to see how each military department chose their respective candidates for closure.
As hearings were held, the community and political leaders of those areas affected
challenged the^ statistics used for each closure, often raising many questions that could
not be defended by the services. The Navy, scolded by a former Commissioner as being
the least cooperative to the previous Commission, elected to conduct a structured review
process for examination of the Naval shore establishment. They utilized several in-place
systems to assist them in this process. One was the Department of the Navy Shore
Facility Planning System and the other was the Navy Facility Assets Data Base.
The first step that the Base Structure Commission took was to put all facilities
within a functional category and then through a capacity analysis, determine which
21

categories had significant excess capacity. Table 4-3 is a complete listing of categories
which cover all Navy facilities. (13:14)
Table 4-3 N avy Functional Categories
1. Naval Stations 15. Supply Centers/Depots
2. Naval Air Stations 16. Inventory Control Points
3. Submarine Bases 17. Training
4. Medical 18. Educational
5. Ordnance Storage 19. Air Reserve
6. Ordnance Production 20. Communications/Intelligence
7. Strategic Ordnance 21. Administration
-8. RDT&E 22. Construction Battalion Centers
9. Technical Production 23. Public Works Centers
10 Shipyards 24. Reserve Centers
11 Ship Repair 25. Marine Corps Air Stations
12 Trident Refit 26. Marine Corps Recruiting Depot
13 Aviation Depots 27. Marine Corps Bases
14 Marine Corps Logistics 28. Marine Corps Unique Mission
(13:14)
Those functional categories with significant excess capacity then received closer
scrutiny by the Base Structure Committee. All bases within a category that had excess
capacity, were then evaluated by the military value (the first four) criteria from the
Department of Defense final criteria. Input from operational commanders was taken and
the geographical criticality of each facility was considered. (The closure of some
geographically key bases might adversely affect other bases not planned for closure thus
necessitating careful consideration of their future.) At this point, those categories which
contained no significant excesses were removed from further consideration for closure or
realignment. The Navy called this the Phase I process.
The Phase II process entailed detailed review of all bases within those functional
categories remaining from Phase I. All these facilities were evaluated against all eight of
the final criteria. When this review was completed, the chairman of the Base Structure
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Committee, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Environment), then
made her recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy for facilities to be closed and
realigned. (13:13)
4.7 Capacity Analysis
When the categories were evaluated in light of the force -structure requirements,
the Navy could determine what they had too much of and what they had too little of.
This method of review is know as capacity analysis. This is how the method worked.
First, units of measure were needed for evaluation. So, critical facility category codes
were selected that best represented the capacity for bases serving that category. An
example would be piers for Naval Stations or hangers and airfield pavement for Naval
Air Stations.
Next, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command manual, Facility Planning
Criteria for Navy and Marine Corps Shore Facilities, was consulted to determine
quantities such as the number of feet of pier berthing space in the case of Naval Stations
or number of square feet of pavement and hangers for Naval Air Stations needed to
support the force -structure requirements. Other limiting factors such as security, in-
port ratios, sea-shore rotation, explosives safety, etc. were considered in conjunction
with the standard measurement units for significant effects on each installation as
appropriate.
An example of how these other limiting factors might influence a category can
be illustrated as follows. Consider a category such as Naval Air Stations with excess
airfield pavement and hangers that might appear to be a candidate for excess capacity.
However, another factor such as airspace congestion or limited use of airspace around
23

developed areas might limit the effectiveness of certain Naval Air Stations thus reducing
their square footage from the calculations since they are in effect not fully usable.
Next the Navy Facilities Assets Data Base was utilized to compare what was
available in the Navy's inventory against what was needed. Capacity excesses and
deficiencies were then determined and identified for consideration by the Committee.
Four categories were found to have excess capacity to the degree that they warranted
further study. They were:
(1) Naval Stations,
(2) Naval Air Stations,
(3) Shipyards, and
(4) Marine Corps Air Stations.
Four additional categories did not have significant excess capacity but were set aside for
further study because they were either: (a) of a "follower" nature that were not needed if
other regional facilities were closed, (b) contained some parts that had deficiencies while
others had excesses (typically at the sub category level), or (c) were recommended for




(4) Construction Battalion Centers. (13:15-17)
4.8 Environmental Costs
The issue of using the costs of cleaning- up contaminated sites on military
installations in the return on investment evaluation criteria was a critical one. Because
the Department of Defense has committed to cleaning- up its contaminated sites
24

(and such action would eventually take place whether the base was considered for
closure or not), the position was ultimately taken that the costs for environmental clean-
up were not to be considered in the cost calculations for return on investment or for the
20 -year cost savings.
However, many facilities have environmental compliance costs associated with
their day-to-day existence such as air, water and land pollution control facilities. If
these costs can be avoided by the closure of a facility then they were to be factored into
the costs, or savings, of that closing. Additionally, if certain installations could not be
quickly cleaned-up then this may be a potential limitation on the near-term reuse of the
property and affect the timing of when the estimated fair market value of the property,
if any, is realized. Because of these environmental cost implications, Congress paid
significant attention to them before, during and after the enacting legislation was passed.
(12:11)
4.9 Recommendations
On April 12, 1991, the Secretary of Defense transmitted his list of recommended
closures and realignments to the Base Closure Commission and to Congress. He
recommended 43 bases or facilities for closure and 28 for realignment. Included in this
list were 11 Navy bases and 10 activities (for a total of 21) for closure, and one Navy
base and 16 activities (for a total of 17) for realignment. (7:3-4)
In May, the Commission received the report from the General Accounting
Office, analyzing the Secretary's recommendations. The Commission sought to gain a
detailed understanding through public hearings and site visits of what the services were
trying to do while balancing the fairness of the overall process. In eleven weeks, the
Commission held 28 hearings and visited 47 major military installations.
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On July 1, 1991, they transmitted their recommendations to the President who forwarded
them to Congress on July 10, 1991. After making certain changes, the Commission's
recommendation to the President identified 34 bases for closure (9 less than the Secretary
recommended) and 48 for realignment (15 more than the Secretary recommended). The
Commission reported that these actions were expected to achieve a net $2.3 billion in
savings after a one-time cost of $4.1 billion with annual savings of $1.5 billion after
1998. (11:7-8) Table 4-4 reflects the final Navy facilities selected by the Commission.
Facilities that are so small that they fall below the Section 2687, Title 10 thresholds are
not shown here. (14:1-26)
Table 4-4 Major Navy Facilities On the Base Closure and Realignment Report
FACILITY ACTION 20 YR SAVINGS
Hunters Point Annex, CA Close $ 1,600,000
Naval Station Long Beach, CA Close $634,900,000
Naval Station Philadelphia, PA Close $210,700,000
Naval Station Sand Point, WA Close -$12,500,000 *
Naval Air Station Chase Field, TX Close $ 95,200,000
Naval Air Station Moffett Field, CA Close $357,100,000
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA Close $ 22,500,000
Naval Shipyard Philadelphia, PA Close $171,900,000
Constrn. Battalion Ctr. Davisville, RI Close $ 7,500,000
Naval Hospital Long Beach, CA Close $ 17,600,000
Naval Air Facility Midway Island Realign $ 53,300,000
* Note this will cost not save in the 20 year time frame d ue to comparison of




OVERVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
5.1 History
As a result of base closures or realignments, local communities that have grown
up over the years to support the base, often are the hardest hit by the sudden loss of
employment. The supporting service industries, as well as the direct jobs at the
installation to be closed, may constitute a significant percentage of the community job
market and tax base. Therefore, when these jobs are lost, the ripple effects are felt over
a wide area of influence and cause considerable concern among the community's political
leaders.
Because of this down side of base closings, Congress, at the request of their local
communities, sought to ease this burden by imposing certain regulations on the military
department actually closing the base, while at the same time providing the means for
those military departments to offer assistance programs to help the communities and
affected civilian workers.
5.2 Implementation Provisions
When Congress constructed and approved Public Law 101-510 in 1990, it built in
certain implementation provisions. These provisions outlined what the Department of
Defense could and must do while carrying out their closures and realignments. They fell
into three main areas: (1) environmental, (2) community action and (3) property disposal.
Additionally, time limits were imposed on the process as well. All closures and
realignments were mandated to be started within two years of Presidential approval of
the recommendations and to be completed within six years of the same date.
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Two significant changes in this law deviated from normal regulations already on
the books and allowed variations in the areas of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 and the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949. These
changes allowed the Secretary of Defense greater latitude in preparing for the closures
and will be -discussed in greater detail in later chapters. In addition, Congress
established the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 to fund certain
closure actions and allowed for oversight of the whole process by certain reporting
requirements. This also will be covered in more detail in a later chapter.
5.3 Facilities
Caught up early on in the base closure process was construction of previously
planned facilities at installations that might be placed on the closure list. Because of this
possibility, the execution of major construction contracts was stopped across the country
unless a waiver was granted specifically allowing the contract to go forward. The
Department of Defense did not want to suffer the waste of money as well as the
political chastisement of building a new structure only to have it closed months later.
During the review process, the status of planned construction at bases being
considered for closure and realignment, and anticipated replacement facilities at
receiving installations were considered and evaluated. Obviously since nothing could
happen until the closure list was approved, this caused a significant workload reduction
in the normal design, contract and execution portions of each military department's
construction contract divisions.
However, once the approval was granted, (or disapproval failed as Congress
established in the law) then there was a rush to design, award and construct new
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replacement facilities at receiving locations. This step, which often takes 2 to 5 years to
accomplish, was a precursor to relocation of certain functions from one facility to
another and forced the service engineering commands into a "fast track" mode
immediately following the previous slow period. Needless to say there were some
planning and execution problems with this sequence, but in typical "Can Do" fashion, the
Naval Facilities Engineering Command was able to respond to the challenge.
Additionally, funds had to be budgeted for these new facilities. This again
required a "fast track' of the budget approval process by Congress in order to start the so
called "daisy chain" of events in the overall Military Construction program. Appendix A
contains an outline of the base closure process relative to the out years and shows how
the budgeting and construction of new facilities comes very early in the process and is
critical to the follow on phases.
5.4 Overview of Environmental Requirements
The two main environmental areas of concern in this process are the
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).
Both acts are discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, as well as the Defense
Environmental Restoration Program that is utilized for cleanup of contaminated base
sites.
5.5 Overview of Community Action Programs
Congress spelled out in its legislation that the military departments should
provide community assistance to those areas in need. Specifically, they should provide:
(1) economic adjustment assistance, (2) community planning assistance and (3) out
placement assistance to civilian personnel employed by the Department of Defense at the
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military installations being closed or realigned. These programs are reviewed in Chapter
7 in detail.
5.6 Overview of Property Disposal Requirements
And, finally, the rules for property disposal, which previously provided that the
General Services Administration handle this function, were modified to allow the
Secretary of Defense authority to dispose of surplus property under certain conditions






6.1 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)
This all encompassing law affects any project that has federal funding or comes
under the control of federal agencies. Its primary purpose is to force the agency
initiating the action to take a "hard look" at what the impacts of its actions are to the
area being acted upon. It particularly is important because it gives the public the chance
to become involved in the decision-making process. Unfortunately, it is a costly and
time consuming process that often frustrates the agency seeking to take the action. More
often than not, if the agency's project is opposed, this process can allow knowledgeable
opponents the opportunity to delay the starting of the project for a considerable period
of time.
The act created the Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of
the President, to which federal agencies must submit their Environmental Impact
Statements (EIS) for review. No action can take place on federal projects until the
council approves the Environmental Impact Statement about that project. This EIS, as it
is commonly known, requires that the action agency investigate the environmental
impacts that the new action will have on the affected community or area. These impacts
range from changes in the soil to economics and cover dozens of technical and
subjective areas. This EIS is an all important document because it becomes the base
document that managers must use to make their decisions. It also becomes a key legal
document for any court cases held regarding the new action. (15:41-42)
The conflict between the Department of Defense in trying to close bases and the
National Environmental Policy Act was that the Environmental Impact Statement was
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often attacked by concerned citizens. The government would often be taken to court
and held there for years awaiting resolution of critical issues, while politicians from the
affected district constantly sought ways to frustrate the interested military department,
which they perceived was trying to take jobs away from their district. These actions
effectively prevented the Department from closing any major bases in the early and
mid-1980's.
However, Congress responded to the Department's requests for "relief from the
process" by suspending the requirements of NEPA, except for final property disposal and
some realignment actions, in the 1988 base closure legislation. When the 1990 law was
being framed, the Department again sought and received relief from the NEPA
regulations under the same conditions.
In particular the law stated that, the President and the Commission, and except as
specifically provided, the Department of Defense, shall not be subject to the provisions
of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 according to paragraph (c) of Section
2905 of Public Law 101-510. Only in the areas of property disposal and movement of
realigned or closed functions to a new receiving location is the Department required to
carry out the NEPA Process. (16:13) However, even then the Department does not have
to consider:
(i) the need for closing or realigning the military
installation which has been recommended for closure or
realignment by the Commission;
-(ii) the need for transferring functions to any military
installation which has been selected as the receiving
installation; or
(iii) military installations alternative to those
recommended or selected. (7:133)
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And to even further limit the Department's exposure in these remaining areas,
any civil actions for judicial review against the requirements of the NEPA Process must
be filed within 60 days after the date of such act or failure to act.
Therefore, the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act were
circumvented in the preliminary base closure process and greatly reduced during the
implementation phase. This concession by Congress was allowed, however, with the
understanding that the Secretary of Defense would ensure that the military departments
carefully examined what effects the closures would have on the local communities.
6.2 Environmental Restoration
An important concern of Congress in the base closure process was the proper
clean-up of contaminated sites prior to disposal. Under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), also
known as the "Superfund Law," restoration of contaminated sites to environmentally safe
conditions was mandated nationwide. In a follow on program, the Department of
Defense established the Defense Environmental Restoration Program to ensure that the
CERCLA requirements were met on military installations. Both of these became integral
parts to the base closure process as did the funding for the actual site cleanup since
Congress felt that the sale of the surplus property would not occur until the bases were
properly decontaminated.
Therefore, in the implementation section of the law, Congress directed that:
The Secretary may - (C) carry out activities for the
purposes of environmental restoration and mitigation at
any such installation, and may use for such purposes funds
in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of




In addition to recognizing the importance of the environmental restoration
process, Congress allowed the Department of Defense to use several initiatives to
expedite the process and thus speed the bases towards quick disposal. These
Congressional backed initiatives fall under the section calling for the establishment of a
model program (Section 2926). Under this program the Department will be required to
seek:
(1) -methods to expedite the clean-up,
(2) ways of accelerating the contracting process,
(3) alternatives for avoiding disputes,
(4) concurrent regulatory review, and
(5) options for local reuse while clean-up is in progress.
The Department is also forming an Environmental Response Task Force to report
on ways to:
(1) improve interagency coordination of environmental response actions,
(2) streamline and consolidate regulations, practices and policies, and
(3) improve environmental restoration at closing bases. (7:122)
These actions listed above are taking place while the Department is
reemphasizing efforts currently in progress to: "(1) use Interagency Agreements which
specify details for restoration at National Priority List sites and (2) use Memoranda of
Agreement between the Department of Defense and States for resolving technical
disputes at these same National Priority List sites." (7:122)
6.3 Congressional Concerns
However, some members of Congress have some serious objections to the speed
at which the clean-up program is moving. They state that the technology used to
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clean-up sites .within five years rather than say ten or fifteen is very different and much
more expensive than that used for the longer period of time. These members feel that
the "push" by local communities to get their hands on these properties as soon as
possible, while at the same time taking no responsibility for the health risks, forces the
Department of Defense to spend money unnecessarily.
It is argued also that it is very costly to clean-up the contamination assuming the
highest economic use of the property, such as residential, when in fact much of the
property will obviously be used for industrial and other purposes requiring lower levels
of decontamination. It is also argued that some properties will never be able to be
cleaned-up, such as test ranges and proving grounds where unknown numbers of
unexploded ordnance lie buried beneath the ground.
These members of Congress argue that the "rush to throw money at clean-up" in
order to quickly return the property to local communities may deserve the consideration
of trying to spend the dwindling amount of available tax payer money as wisely as
possible, rather than giving in to the local political pressure to turn the bases over as fast






In Section 2905, Implementation, of the 1990 base closure law, Congress states
that the Secretary of Defense may - (B) provide -
(i) economic adjustment assistance to any community
located near a military installation being closed or
realigned, and
(ii) community planning assistance to any community
located near a military installation to which functions will
be transferred as a result of the closure or realignment of a
military installation, if the Secretary of Defense determines
that the financial resources available to the community (by
grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate, and
may use for such purposes funds in the [base closure]
Account or funds appropriated to the Department of
Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community
planning assistance. (7:131-132)
In July of 1991, representatives from the Chief of Naval Operations, Naval
Facilities Engipeering Command, Office of Economic Adjustment, Assistant Secretary of
the Navy, Office of General Counsel, Bureau of Personnel, Office of Civilian Personnel
Management, and several other major commands within the Navy were assembled to
form a Base Closure/Community Liaison Working Group to assist Naval bases, personnel
and communities affected by closure or realignment. Areas such as general information,
legal requirements, community resources and employee resources were covered to assist
those affected. (17:1)
7.2 Economic Adjustment Assistance
In order to ease the impacts associated with base closures and realignments,
typically the loss of jobs and supporting tax base on closing bases, and an increase of
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infrastructure demands on receiving communities, the Department of Defense initiated
an Economic Adjustment Program in 1961. In the 1970's, much of this function shifted
to the President's Economic Adjustment Committee. This Committee is made up of
members from 18 federal departments and agencies. As support staff to this committee,
the Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment conducts surveys of past
base closures and offers field consultation with communities on methods and funding for
reuse and redevelopment of the closed facilities in their area when requested.
In general, the Economic Adjustment Committee interacts with state, federal and
local agencies* concerning methods to redevelop the community that is affected by
changes from the base closures and realignments. Plans to generate new jobs and to
assist in minimizing the resulting social and economic impacts are drawn up with the
communities who request this assistance. Together with the community leaders, the
Committee attempts to convert the physical and real estate assets of former bases to
productive uses such as airports, industrial parks, recreational areas, educational
campuses, and medical centers. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to
make grants where financial assistance to get a community plan "off the ground" is
warranted. (7:119-120)
A study of 100 former military bases closed since 1961 revealed that communities
can and have successfully adjusted to the base closures. In the five major categories of
reuse it was found that:
75 former bases now have industrial and office parks located on them,
57 former bases now have educational institutions located on them,
42 former bases now have airports located on them,
27 former bases now have recreational facilities located on them, and
19 former bases now have health related activities located on them. (17:14)
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The survey which measured "job replacement generation and reuses for the
former bases, *as accomplished and reported by the communities themselves ... [which]
were conservative since they excluded secondary and off-base jobs" found:
- that new jobs do replace those lost by the Department of Defense. At bases
where 93,000 former civil servant and contractor jobs were lost, 158,000 civilian
jobs now exist.
- Additionally, new opportunities have been created is the area of education.
Four- year colleges and post-secondary vocational technical institutes or
community colleges now exist on former base locations. (7:120-121)
While the study noted that the 3 to 5 year transition period between the closing
of the bases and the start-up of new civilian uses was occasionally hard on the
communities, it did often provide the area with a large piece of developed and/or
undeveloped land for long range planning and use in charting their future. (7:120-121)
The objectives of base reuse and job replacement which provide for community
economic stability are reached through three phases. Organization of the community,
planning for the future, and implementation of the plan. The Office of Economic
Adjustment recommends that communities develop a committee of seven or nine
members that cover a large cross-section of the public and private sectors. This
committee should be assisted by a full-time professional staff, such as those found in
many Chamber of Commerce Economic Development Departments. This organization
would serve as: (1) the community focal point for interaction with state and federal
agencies, (2) a forum for community issues and information, and (3) the leadership for
developing the. base reuse plan. (17:5-9) Appendix B contains a sample organizational
chart showing how this committee would interact with the other players in this process.
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The planning phase allows the community organization to identify what the
impacts are, where the opportunities exist and what needs can be met. These goals can
be met by building a consensus within the community on what their unique needs are,
by preparing what the Office of Economic Adjustment calls a Base Reuse Plan, showing
desired and zoned industrial and office parks, educational areas, etc. Then the
organization needs to address how the physical property is to be converted, if necessary,
and whether public or private funding is needed, and, if so, who will take the action to
secure it. Finally, in this phase, the organization needs to keep the public and potential
future users informed through the process while allowing input from these same sources
as the situation develops and changes occur. (17:11-12)
In the final implementation phase, the committee will identify, acquire, and
apply the resources to carry out the communities base reuse plan. Additionally, they
will coordinate and expedite the development process while monitoring its progress.
Their resources may come in the form of technical assistance, management help,
financial aid, and public investment from federal, state or local sources, in addition to
private sector financing. While the fruits of this process may not be seen in the early
years, the actions of the local economic adjustment committee will pay off in the long
run as the cyclical nature of markets and economic conditions drive growth in
communities that plan for the future. (17:16-17)
Areas that have military installations that are receiving missions and personnel
can also be affected rather suddenly. If there is a small change or a change in a large
metropolitan area, then the impact of the change is probably insignificant. However, if
a large mission entailing hundreds or thousands of personnel is relocated to a small or
moderate sized community, then this can have sudden and often severe impacts. New
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infrastructure needs such as roads, sewers, and schools, may be required in an expedited
manner to accommodate the relocation. Usually communities have not budgeted for
such sudden expenditures nor for the planning and design of them which must take
place early on to meet their needs down the road.
Congress understood this problem from past experiences and allowed the
Secretary of Defense to provide assistance, when requested, primarily in the form of
grants, if the community was unable to meet such needs themselves. While this normally
is a city planning function, again Congress has attempted to ease the political heat by
offering to mitigate this type of impact on the community. It should be pointed out
however, that -the military departments take a back seat role in this area allowing the
affected communities to handle most of the details. (7:119)
7.3 Homeowners Assistance Program
Obviously, when the announcement of a base closure or realignment is made that
affects large numbers of workers relative to the community work force, or certain
classes of workers relative to the housing market available to them, then serious negative
affects such as the "bottom falling out" of the local housing market can occur. If the
federal civil servants and military personnel who own housing in the local market are
forced to move as a result of the closure, the Department of Defense recognizes that
they may be at a serious disadvantage when it comes to selling their house. (18:775)
Because of this problem, the Homeowners Assistance Program was established in
1966 to help those families affected by forced moves resulting from base closure. The




buying their homes for 75 percent of their pre-closure announcement value, or
reimbursing them for most lost equity should the homeowners sell the house
for less than the pre-closure announcement value.
[Additionally,] the program also provides relief for displaced employees facing
foreclosure. (7:122)
The program is not a profit making one. While it was initially funded with
appropriated funds with the intent to replenish it with the proceeds from houses that are
sold or rented, these revenues do not totally cover the costs. Therefore, additional
appropriations must be made from time to time to replenish the fund. The
replenishment amounts for the fiscal year 1990 through 1993 programs, as shown in
Table 7-1, indicate how much this assistance program actually costs in light of the 1991
base closings. (18:775)
Table 7-1 Cost to Reimburse Homeowners Assistance Fund
FY 1990 Program $ 8,100,000
FY 1991 Program $ 30,600,000
FY 1992 Program $ 89,000,000
FY 1993 Program $ 90,000,000
(18:775)
7.4 Civilian Employee Assistance
With the announcements of base closures comes the fact that jobs will be lost.
As facilities are closed and missions relocated, many of the functions performed by civil
servants are abolished necessitating either relocation or termination of their jobs. Both
the Department of Defense and Congress, while anticipating the savings from the
closures regret the impact that it has on these individuals. Because of this unfortunate
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side effect to the base closure process, the Department established a Priority Placement
Program in the 1960's to help offset the closings of that decade.
This program uses a state-of-the-art automated referral system to match
individuals skills and desires with available positions in other Department locations, both
in and out of an individual's commuting area. This cost effective program, which is
regarded as the most effective out-placement program in the Federal Service, sends bi-
weekly notices out to every Department activity world wide listing skills available. The
Civilian Personnel Office of each activity then matches skills with openings and starts
the process of putting the two together.
The program is the main tool for placing adversely affected career civil servants who are
interested in placement assistance. Approximately 63 percent are placed in Department
or other Federal jobs and of the 14 percent who are actually separated, most could have
been placed if they had been willing to move to other locations in the same geographic
area. (19:39-43) Of those placed, surveys show that 99 percent of the supervisors who
received employees through the program have been satisfied. Additionally, over 66
percent have held their last grades or have been promoted. (7:123)
The Department also is working with the Office of Personnel Management which
runs the Interagency Placement Assistance Program. This program works outside the
Department to help employees who face separation from their jobs before any
reductions-in-Torce occur. Once the Department determines which employees do not
wish to be moved to other job openings or for whom job possibilities are limited with
the Department, then they can be registered with this program. (19:60)
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Another program that is government wide is the Displaced Employee Program.
This program assists other agency assistance programs by placing interested, affected
employees on a Federal wide register for any geographic area of their choosing. Career
employees who are separated are given a priority referral to fill available positions for a
period of two years. (20:56)
In general, both Congress and the Department of Defense have held to the belief
that the affected civilian employees should not be abandoned nor punished as a result of
the base closure process. Some members of Congress have wondered if these programs
can handle the thousands of civilian employees who are expected to be affected by the
closures in effect and those anticipated. However, it must be remembered that with a
federal work force of over a million employees and a Department of Defense attrition
rate of 70,000 to 80,000 full-time career professionals per year, the system has






One of the significant areas considered by the 1988 and 1990 Commissions was
that of disposal of surplus property resulting from the closure of military installations.
At the foreground of this concern was controversy over the means of disposal of surplus
federal property. During the early 1980's, the Reagan Administration sought to reduce
the Federal deficit by disposing of surplus real property and putting the proceeds
towards this purpose. While this idea was creative, it carried with it many problems and
angered many in Congress who felt the President was "selling off the farm to pay the
bills."
Though not directly related to the changed disposal practices allowed by Congress
through the 1988 and 1990 enacting Base Closure legislation, these early efforts did lay
the groundwork for the changes. They planted the seed in the mind of Congress that
excess Federal property could be used to offset the costs for a cost saving program (base
closure) without taking significant funds from other areas to get it started.
The basis of the changes stemmed from a negative incentive system that affected
the closure of bases. When a base was closed in the past, there were significant costs
associated with the relocation of the mission, movement of personnel and equipment,
and the clean-up and turnover of the former installation. These costs typically came out
of operating and maintenance funds and seriously affected needed training and support.
Most military departments, while realizing the efficiencies of closing facilities in the
long term, had to sacrifice short term funds to make it happen. When funds were
scarce, as they usually were, they became even more reluctant to dig into their own
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pockets to affect these long term economies. However, the Department of Defense had
argued that if -the funds from the disposal of surplus property at the closed bases could
be utilized for the closure process, or if Congress would appropriate separate funds, then
the closure process would not have a negative impact on the day-to-day operations of
the services.
When the legislation was passed in 1988 for the first closure process, it contained
significant changes to the methods of property disposal by the Department of Defense.
The Secretary of Defense now could act as a disposal agent for the government and
could recoup the proceeds from the sale of excess property to fund the closure process.
These changes to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, which is
the main law governing disposal of Federal property, allowed the Secretary to assume
certain duties .of the Administrator of the General Services Administration, and with
limitations and conditions, oversee the disposal of Department of Defense excess
property. (21:40-41)
8.2 The 1990 Law
With few exceptions, the property disposal process provided for in the 1988
enacting legislation was used again in the 1990 legislation. Section 2905,
Implementation, paragraph (b), Management and Disposal of Property, stated that:
- The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary of
Defense, with respect to excess and surplus real property and facilities located at
a military installation closed or realigned under this law -
(A) the authority to use excess property,
(B) the authority to dispose of surplus property,
(C) the authority to grant approvals about surplus property,
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(D) the authority to determine the availability of excess or surplus real property
for wildlife conservation purposes.
- Additionally, the Secretary must follow all rules of the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949 and the Surplus Property Act of 1944 and
may not enact new policies or methods for utilizing excess property and
disposing of surplus property.
- The Secretary may transfer real property or facilities located at a military
installation to be closed or realigned, with or without reimbursement, to a
military department or other entity within the Department of Defense or the
Coast Guard.
- Before disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military
installation to be closed or realigned, the Secretary shall consult with the
Governor of the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the
purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by the local
community concerned.
- The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to
the property disposal process.
And under Section 2906, Account, proceeds received from the transfer or
disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned shall be
deposited into the Account which shall be administered by the Secretary.
(7:132-133)
8.3 Hierarchy of Disposal
Once the closure list is finalized, then a few months later the disposal process
begins (see Appendix A). At this point, the easy part has been done because the
Department of Defense knew going into the recommendation stage what they wanted to
dispose of. The next step is the hierarchical process to see what will really happen to
the excess property, whether it will generate any proceeds or whether it will be "given
away" during the disposal screening process.
As stated in the law, the Department has the first option to decide whether the
excess property can be used for other Department needs. Since the underlying reason
for closing the bases in the first place was that they were not needed, this option will
seldom be utilized with the exception for small special mission portions of facilities that
can operate outside the base support atmosphere. The Navy has strongly discouraged
46

retention of property at bases to be closed and established as their policy that approval
can only be granted by the Chief of Naval Operations for retention of Navy property at
these locations. (22:1)
Once the first option is passed, any remaining property not taken by other
Department of Defense activities, is determined to be excess to the Department. The
next option is a dual option in which the property is screened concurrently for other
Federal agencies and for homeless providers under the McKinney Act. The screening
for homeless providers is done by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
and cannot start any earlier than 18 months before the date of proposed transfer.
In the case that there is an approved application for homeless use, the military
department (the Navy) has two options. They can transfer the property to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development or, if there is a "compelling federal
need," they can transfer it to another Federal agency. In the event there is no homeless
need, then other Federal agencies should have little difficulty in having the desired
property transferred to them. Of course, the transfer at this stage is at fair market value
unless specifically waived by the Office of Management and Budget.
Any property remaining available after the first and second options is determined
to be surplus to the Federal government and notification of state and local governments
begins. At this point, any property turned over must be in compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and will require an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) which will take about 18 months to complete. Critical to the EIS is knowledge
about the intended end use of the base property and its structures. The base closure
personnel must begin to work closely with the local community to establish what the
future prospects of the base are in order to prepare the EIS.
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The Department of Defense can convey surplus property to state and local
entities for certain "public benefit uses" such as public health facilities, airports,
recreational and educational areas, but deeds must clearly restrict the property's use to
just that purpose. Similarly, wetlands and historical areas can be conveyed in much the
same way.
The majority of the remaining property will probably be handled through a
negotiated sale with local communities based on fair market value. This action is
dependent, however, on the establishment of a community reuse plan as discussed in
Chapter 7. At this point, both the base closure staff and the community reuse
committee should be communicating quite often in order to convey what assets are
available and their condition on one hand, while formulating a reuse strategy based on
these assets on.the other.
Typically, the reuse planning should be conducted in conjunction with the
screening process due to the limited time available. The plan should be finished after
the screening is complete, which in turn should be at least 12 months before planned
disposal in order to allow time to complete the NEPA process (review of appendix A
will clarify this time constraint). All actions in which property is to be sold to local or
state governments must be reviewed by the Senate Committee on governmental affairs
and the House Committee on government operations prior to such conveyance.
In the event that the community elects not to become involved in a reuse plan,
then the final option is to offer the property for public sale. This sale may be handled
by either sealed bid procedures or public auction, but can be sold only if the offering
price is commensurate with the fair market value. (23:1-3)
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During the phase down process prior to closure, large quantities of personal
property such as office and barracks furniture, transportation equipment and industrial
machinery will become available. The Navy has mandated that commands should seek to
transfer such items for use to other Navy facilities where possible. Personal property
excess to the Navy's needs will be turned over to the Defense Reutilization Marketing
Office for reuse by other Department of Defense activities. (24:1)
Additionally, there may be a lengthy time between the end of the base's mission
and acceptance of the property by another party. During this transition stage the
General Services Administration has recommended a number of measures that should be
performed to ensure that the property is properly cared for from a physical plant
perspective as well as for security, safety and appearance concerns. It will be incumbent
upon the base commanding officers to utilize their resources to see that these






Congress mandated that an account, known as the Department of Defense Base
Closure Account 1990, be established in the Treasury for administration by the Secretary
of Defense. This type of account, which was first utilized for the 1988 closure process,
remains basically the same in the 1990 legislation.
As mentioned earlier, paying for the closure process had been a negative
incentive prior to 1988. After the changes Congress made to this process, "seed money"
was placed into the account to get it started with the expectation that proceeds from the
sale of surplus property would replenish the account. Additionally, the Secretary could
transfer other appropriated funds into the account, with the approval of Congress, such
as appropriated construction funds for programmed but unbuilt new facilities on bases to
be closed.
The Secretary was limited in the use of the funds to items spelled out under the
Implementation Section of the Law, Section 2905. These limitations included:
- acquisition of land,
- construction of replacement facilities,
- advance planning,
- planning and design of minor construction,
- operations and maintenance,
- economic adjustment assistance,
- community planning assistance,
- environmental restoration and mitigation,
- out placement assistance to civilian employees, and to




Additionally, limitations were placed on the level of funds used for construction
without prior approval of Congress.
In Section 2923, "Funding for Environmental Restoration at Military Installations
Scheduled for Closure Inside the United States," Congress also appropriated $100,000,000
for the exclusive use of environmental clean-up at bases selected for closure. This
effort was made to expedite the clean-up process by giving the Secretary authority to
combine needed clean-up with the requirement to complete the closure process in the
mandated time. Congress did not wish to have the required bases closed but not
disposed of because separate clean-up legislation and funding had slowed down the
overall process. (7:133-138)
9.2 Congressional Oversight
With the tainted base closure history from the 1960's, and the political concerns
between the executive and the legislative branches of the government, Congress felt the
need for some type of control and oversight to the program. Therefore, the 1990
legislation required the Department of Defense to make annual reports to the various
Congressional committees regarding the status of the implementation process for the
approved base closures and realignments. These reports include:
- a schedule of the closure and realignment actions each year,
- a description of actions at receiving facilities,
- costs and savings of the program,
- an assessment of the environmental effects at the receiving bases, and





A CASE STUDY OF CONSTRUCTION BATTALION CENTER DAVISVILLE, RI
10.1 History *
Established in 1942 as the Davisville Advance Base Depot, Construction Battalion
Center (CBC) Davisville, Rhode Island, as it is known today, is the "Original Home of
the Seabees." It is located some 20 miles south of Providence and contains approximately
1,300 acres of land at two locations, the main base site and Camp Fogarty. Its main
mission has been as a mobilization base for Reserve Naval Mobile Construction
Battalions while at the same time serving as a storage location for Prepositioned War
Reserve Material Stock for these same battalions. (Under the one force concept, Reserve
has been dropped from the name of these battalions. They are now called Naval Mobile
Construction Battalions as their active duty counterparts are, although we will continue
to refer to them as reserves for clarity to the reader.)
The base was part of a larger Naval Complex prior to the 1970's, but the Naval
Shore Establishment Realignment Plan closed the adjacent Naval Air Station Quonset
Point in 1973. Because of time and distance, the other Naval facilities in the
Narragansett Bay area, primarily those located in Newport, are isolated from useful
inter-action with CBC Davisville, further leading to the lack of attention it receives
toward accepting other possible missions. (13:Tab H:10-ll)
10.2 Review Under the 1990 Base Closure Process
One of the 28 Navy functional categories, as listed in Chapter 4, is Construction
Battalion Centers or CBCs. Since CBCs perform a unique mission of support to Naval
Mobile Construction Battalions, of which there are eight active and 15 reserve, as well as
other units of the Naval Construction Force, they were set aside within their own
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functional category for evaluation. Administration and training are two of the primary
support functions provided by CBCs, but storage, preservation and shipment of
Prepositioned War Reserve Material Stocks is also essential. There are three Construction
Battalion Centers among the Navy's shore facilities, one in Davisville, Rhode Island, one
in Gulfport, Mississippi, and one in Port Hueneme, California.
During the review process, when the capacity analysis was conducted for the
CBCs, the critical facility categories of warehousing and administrative space were
selected (training, which falls under another functional category was not considered
directly associated with the requirements of the CBCs and therefore was not used as a
critical category). It was found that there was a deficiency in the warehousing
requirement and an excess in the administrative space requirement as shown in Table
10-1. (13:Tab H:l-2)
Table 10-1 Capacity Analysis of CBCs
Indices/Measure Inventory Requirement Excess/(Deficiencv)
Warehouse/ KSF 5,062 5,889 (827)
Admin./ KSF 540 403 137
* KSF:*1000 square feet
(13:Tab H:l-2)
10.3 Final Criteria
The next step in the process was application of the final criteria since excess
capacity did exist in this category. During Phase I, the Base Structure Committee looked
at all the CBCs in regards to criteria 1-4 (military value). The Committee elected to use
a color system to rank their evaluation of the bases against the criteria. Red was used to
indicate closure and green was used to favor keeping the facility open with yellow
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indicating the middle ground. Therefore each CBC was evaluated against these four
criteria and received either a red, yellow or green rating for each of the evaluation
components.
After reviewing the collected information, the Committee excluded from further
consideration those bases distinguished in the fulfillment of the criteria (those with an
overall green rating). Both CBC Gulfport and CBC Port Hueneme fell into this category
as shown in Table 10-2. (13:Tab H:2-7).
Table 10-2 Phase I Ratings of CBCs
Overall Land/ Contingency/ Cost/
Rating Mission Facilities Mobilization Manpower
(PH 1) Installation Criteria (1) Criteria (2) Criteria (3) Criteria (4)
Y Davisville R Y G G
G Gulfport G G G G
G Port Hueneme G G G G
R: Red Y: Yellow G: Green
(13:Tab H:2-7)
During Phase II, an initial cost analysis was performed and then criteria 1-4 and
6-8 were applied. Again, the color ratings were used for these criteria as the only
remaining candidate, CBC Davisville, was evaluated in each area. Finally, criteria 5,
Cost and Savings, was applied and the return on investment was calculated to determine
if it made good business sense to recommend closure. Table 10-3 shows the final ratings
for CBC Davisville. (13:Tab H:4-7)
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Table 10-3 Phase II Ratings For CBC Davisville
ROI Economic Community Environmental
Impact Support Impact
Installation Criteria (5) Criteria (6) Criteria (7) Criteria (8)
Davisville +30.1/-5.5 R R R
* ROI (Return on investment): One Time Costs/Steady State Savings ($M)
(13:Tab H:4-7)
10.4 Recommendation
Based on the evaluation of the criteria and considering: (a) the reduced mission
of CBC Davisville (no longer a processing site for mobilizing reserves), (b) the high
degree of readiness of the Reserve Naval Construction Force as seen during Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm (thereby eliminating much of the need for pre-deployment
training of reserves), (c) the reduced force -structure (two less reserve construction
battalions), (d) the deteriorated condition of much of the personnel support facilities at
CBC Davisville, and (e) the significant mobilization and support capability exhibited by
CBCs Gulfport and Port Hueneme also during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the
Committee recommended closure of CBC Davisville.
It was recommended also that the Prepositioned War Reserve Material Stock be
distributed to the other two CBCs for ease of access by those commands responsible for
its care and use. All three bases would be affected in the following manner:
CBC Davisville
- Relocation of four officers and four enlisted military personnel.
- Relocation of 30 civilian employees.
- Relocation of three Reserve Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
(RNMCB) table of allowances (equipment) and other Prepositioned




- Increased storage requirement for one RNMCB table of allowance
. requiring some 90,000 square feet of new warehouse space.
- Increase of one officer and one enlisted military personnel.
- Increase of ten civilian employees.
CBC Gulfport
- Increased storage requirement for two RNMCB tables of allowance
and other selected PWRMS requiring some 170,000 square feet of new
warehouse space.
- Increase of three officer and three enlisted military personnel.
- Increase of 20 civilian employees. (13:Tab H:8)
10.5 Costs
The Department of Defense decided to use the same cost model during the 1990
process as was used by the 1988 Commission. It is called the Cost of Base Realignment
Actions (COBRA) model and is used to calculate return on investment. (7:155) For CBC
Davisville, using this model predicts that there will be a one-time cost of $36,600,000
with a payback in 13 years and a return-on- investment of 10 years. Additionally, the
recommendation shows a 20 year net present loss of approximately $7,500,000. Once the
closure is completed, the annual savings are projected to be $5,500,000. (13:Tab H:8-9)
Not added in the cost model are the environmental clean-up costs that would be
required if the base was left open or was closed. Among these are $1,154,000 for
closure and removal of 71 underground storage tanks, removal of PCB transformers, and
disposal of stored hazardous waste. Also, there is an estimated $25,000,000 worth of
restoration costs that must be budgeted for or taken from other environmental accounts.
(13:Tab H:13-14)
10.6 Impact *
Closure of CBC Davisville will have little impact on the surrounding community
because of the few full-time positions that exist at the base and because of the large
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metropolitan area that surrounds it. The loss of 250 direct and indirect positions (0.3 %
of the statistical area work force) will have little impact on the job market or the public
schools. And since the work that is shifted to the other two CBCs is small compared to
what they already do, it also will have a negligible impact on those communities. As far
as environmental impact, closure will speed up the hazardous waste clean-up already
under way at Davisville, and again will have a negligible affect on the other two bases
because of the large volume of similar related activities they already conduct. (7:59)
10.7 Implementation Plan
Before CBC Davisville can be closed, new storage facilities must be constructed
at the other two CBCs. The programming for these facilities must occur no later than
the fiscal year 1993-1994 time frame in order to meet closure deadlines. Some tenant
commands also will remain behind and property transfer or relocation to spaces off the
base must occur. (13:Tab H:14)
To monitor and oversee the base closure process, the Chief of Naval Operations
utilizes a special section of his staff (called OP-44) which is comprised of Civil Engineer
Corps Officers. This staff has developed an implementation plan and milestones for the
closure process at each affected facility. While this staff does not carry out the details
of the process they are responsible for oversight and guidance to the base commanding
officers who must actually carry out the closure.
This special section has broken the process down into four major areas for
planning purposes, they are: (1) draw down, (2) community reuse planning, (3) disposal
and reuse environmental impact statement, and (4) environmental clean-up and property
disposal. Table 10-4 outlines this plan for CBC Davisville as of February 1992. (14:1-2)
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Table 10-4 Implementation Plan for CBC Davisville
Action 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Bevond
1. Draw Down
(a) Closure Approved OCT
(b) Cease Primary Mission SEP
(c) Closure Implemented SEP
2. Community Reuse Plan
(a) Establish Organization MAR
(b) Start Planning Process MAR
(c) Obtain Grant SEP
(d) Draft Preliminary Community Reuse Plan JAN
(e) Rec. Preliminary Available Acreage Info. MAR
(f) Finalize Reuse Plan SEP
3. Disposal and Reuse Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
(a) Begin EIS MAY
(b) Use Prelim. Reuse Plan in Draft EIS JAN
(c) EIS Record of Decision SEP
4. Environmental Clean-up/Propertv Disposal
(a) Complete Prelim. Assessment/Site Inv. 1/90
(b) Provide Prelim. Available Acreage Info. JUL
(c) Complete Remedial Investigations JUL
(d) Complete Feasibility Study (NO EPA review ncl.) JUL
(e) Complete Baseline Survey & Suitability to Transfer MAY
(f) Property Available for Transfer MAY
(g) Complete Remedial Design 10/96
(h) Remedial Actions in Place 02/97
(i) Complete all Department Of Defense clean-up 02/99
(j) Remediated Property Available for Transfer 04/99
(14:1-2)
As we can see there are many steps to this process and the timeline stretches over
eight years. Some of the particulars about where the process is to date are as follows:
A) Draw Down
All tenants have been notified to vacate by September 1993.
B) Impacts of Department Of Defense (POD) Personnel
Separation notices issued to 46 employees in September 1991, 31 were
placed within DOD, 11 were placed with other federal agencies, and 4
were given severance pay and placed on the priority placement register.





A community reuse group is being established including state and local
officials with which the base Commanding Officer will work directly.
D) Environmental Planning
•Phase I of the Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study has been
completed. Phase II should begin in August 1992. Two of the 14
identified sites are being remediated now and the remaining 12 will be
further studied. A contract for the removal of approximately 60
underground storage tanks is underway.
E) Property Disposal
None disposed of to date. Screening process begun with internal DOD
notice sent in December 1991. It should be complete by early 1993. The
Rhode Island National Guard has expressed interest in Camp Fogarty via
Army and Congressional channels. Nearly 1000 beds, mattresses and
other basic furniture items were excessed from the closure of the barracks
and turned over through the Defense Reutilization Marketing Office to
the Neighborhood Furniture Bank of Rhode Island for distribution to the






The closing of bases has predominantly been driven by the intention to exercise
good management practices within the Department of Defense. Some critics argue that
political reprisals are at the heart of some closings but, in general, the overall philosophy
has been well founded. On occasion, unfortunately, the perception, correct or incorrect,
has been that the method of execution has not always been well founded. Herein lies
the basic questions of this issue.
As one of the largest and most expensive organizations in the world, the United
States of America Department of Defense has vast assets of personnel, equipment and
facilities that require hundreds of billions of dollars each and every year just to operate
and maintain them. Added to this, but not included in a yearly budget request, is the
past financial investment in real and personal property, education and training of
personnel, and research and development of defense systems.
Therefore, like any good corporate vice-president, the Secretary of Defense, as
the principal agent in these matters for the chief executive officer, the President, has
made what he considers to be a hard, but necessary budget decision based on the nature
of the market conditions (the economy and the extent of national defense needs). While
this may be a somewhat simplistic view, it serves to put the situation in perhaps a more
businesslike perspective for ease of discussion.
Not uncommon to other business organizations, the Department has adopted some
sound practices to deal with the "hard times" as one might call it. Businesses routinely
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lay-off personnel when the work they perform is no longer needed or it is more
efficient to consolidate their work to other locations. Additionally, plants, factories, real
estate, equipment and other assets are sold off to cut operation and maintenance costs
and generate additional capital. It is not uncommon to trade in or sell your old assets
(your car, for example) when you wish to upgrade, change, or pursue a different asset,
product line, or method of accomplishment.
In these terms, the Secretary has merely exercised good management philosophy
towards cost savings and efficiencies in his organization when his goods were no longer
widely needed (such as a draw down after war) or his marketplace (the world) no longer
needed the deluxe version but only a medium one (such as a small rapidly responding
conventional force rather than a large strategic one). As an executive agent for his
organization, this is his responsibility to plan for and to implement to the best of his
capabilities.
However, the stockholders of his organization have a somewhat different agenda
in mind and frequently and forcefully let the executives know what it is through their
elected leaders, the Congress. The American citizens who are the stockholders of this
enormous organization feel that they should occasionally receive dividends and not have
to pay into the organization all the time.
And, interestingly enough, when they realize that they must pay to keep the
organization running, or to make sacrifices to this same effect, the stockholders do not
mind as much provided someone else bears the burden. This, of course, is popularly
known as the "Not in My Backyard" philosophy where everyone agrees that some action
is needed but just do not ask them to sacrifice for it.
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The conflict of interest between the executive and the stockholders (through the
Congress) is that of "how to close bases," which saves money (and is good for the
organization but bad for the local community who have to sacrifice personally for it),
while at the same time easing the economic burden and negative impact on this same
community. And, moreover, when these closings occur, are the choices used as a
political tool to punish those unfriendly with the executives? These issues are at the
heart of this conflict.
In the past, when the Department of Defense summarily closed hundreds of bases
to save money, they felt they were taking the proper course of action. While Congress
did not object to the saving of money, they did objective to the apparent lack of
objectivity in the selection process and the sudden and unplanned disruption of dozens
of affected communities. Even though the Department did enact some programs to
mediate the impact of these closures, Congress was angered by the lack of control they
had over the methods and impacts of the whole process. This ultimately led Congress to
pass legislation controlling the base closure process which in turn effectively prevented
the Department of Defense from carrying out any cost savings in this area.
Fortunately, as years passed, emotions eased and both branches of the
government realized that potential savings could occur if this process was revived. While
the Department of Defense only wanted the ability to swiftly close bases, efficiently
organize its missions and save money, Congress wanted to have safeguards against the
negative impacts of the process. Therefore, in the late 1980's, both the executive and
the legislative branches worked together to bring about legislation that enacted the 1988
base closure process as well as the revised 1990 process. How well did they do?
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11.2 The Goals of Congress
Congress sought to achieve four main goals through their 1990 legislation of the
base closure process. They were:
(1) to allow the Department of Defense the opportunity to realize proclaimed
budget savings by closing and realigning military bases and missions,
(2) to control the methods and choices for closure in order to avoid
subjectivity and political reprisals,
(3) to minimize the negative impacts the closures and realignments had on
communities, and
(4) to aid in the quick environmental clean-up of contaminated base sites
prior to disposal.
In general, these goals were met with a fair degree of success. The legislation
allowed the Secretary of Defense to initiate his evaluation of the military facilities and
to align them with the newly developed force -structure plan mandated by Congress.
While the numbers have been questioned to some degree, significant savings, as verified
by the General Accounting Office, are apparent.
The current figures indicate that the Department of Defense will realize an
implementation savings of over $500 million with an estimated annual savings of $700
million thereafter from the 1988 process. (7:169) The latest Commission reported the
1990 closures were expected to achieve a net $2.3 billion in savings after a one-time cost
of $4.1 billion with annual savings of $1.5 billion after 1998. (11:7-8)
Through the establishment of criteria that were open for public comment,
Congress established what they felt was a reasonable method for evaluating how
objective the military departments actually were in their closure determinations. Later
review and comment by the General Accounting Office indicated that the utilization of
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these criteria was still somewhat subjective but, nevertheless, it was a workable format
and appeared to remove the undesired political elements from the process.
When it came to impact reduction, Congress made the greatest strides here by
legislating authority to facilitate community action programs and to provide money to
the Secretary of Defense to help impacted communities. This was something which the
Department of Defense had wanted to do just as much as Congress did though not with
their limited operations and maintenance money. The economic adjustment, community
planning and out placement assistance programs were all funded and advertised as
positive means to help communities through the hard times of base closure.
Finally, environmental restoration was brought to the forefront as a real problem
that needed attention and funding if surplus properties were to be quickly and properly
disposed of to communities or offered for public sale. It was perceived as bad enough
to close the local base, but to walk out on the long term health risks associated with past
defense actions was unthinkable, and Congress knew that the local private and public
sectors would have nothing to do with the clean-up. This action was particularly helpful
in opening the eyes of all parties involved, from the public to the press, that
environmental clean-up is a real and costly problem that affects all communities rather
than being someone else's problem only.
11.3 The Objectives of the Department of Defense
What the Defense Department wanted out of this whole process was the ability to
manage its forces and installations in a more efficient manner while avoiding the use of
operations and maintenance funds for the one-time closure costs. Both of these
objectives were realized though perhaps not as easily or freely as they might have
wished. Both were accomplished however, with much less frustration than endured
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during the 1960's to the early 1980's. Additionally, there were big bonuses that they
previously did not have.
First, Congress established a separate account to fund the process. This relieved
the Department from having to fund the closures out of shrinking operations and
maintenance funds. Second, they were allowed to have control over the property
disposal process. This afforded them more flexibility in moving units and missions
while offering an incentive to dispose of property in order to use the proceeds to fund
future closures. And, lastly, the environmental awareness level with its associated costs,
was significantly raised such that Congress provided enacting legislation to help the
Department solve the lengthy clean-up process as rapidly as possible.
11.4 The Impacts on the Communities and Federal Civilian Employees
The communities who are affected bring reality to this whole process and
Congress knew this. It was easy to sit in Washington D.C. and legislate this or that, but
somewhere in America, men and women were going to lose jobs because of these
actions. With unemployment in the 7 percent range, and the country in a recession, loss
of jobs was hard to deal with and politically difficult to swallow, but so was an
enormous defense budget and a debt approaching 4 trillion dollars.
Therefore, Congress attempted to ease the impact by authorizing and funding
several ongoing assistance programs that the Department of Defense had used previously
in similar circumstances. According to a study of past base closures, it was apparent
that there would be an initial economic slump period when the bases first closed. But,
if the community requested the help of the Office of Economic Adjustment and together
they could develop a base reuse plan, then statistics showed that at the 3 to 5 year point
the slump would turn around. Eventually, the former base could end up being
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developed and utilized to provide even more jobs than it had under Department of
Defense use. Additionally, for many communities this would open up large tracts of
land near metropolitan areas that could be used for badly needed recreation and wildlife
purposes.
The concerns of the federal civilian work force were also appreciated. While
little could be done about the actual loss of jobs at certain locations, employees were
assisted in finding work at other Defense locations and federal agencies through
placement programs. Though not 100 percent effective, these programs generally were
of help to the majority of those willing to relocate.
11.5 Summary
As with many difficult situations, compromise solutions are available if the
parties are all willing to make some sacrifices. In this particular case, while trying to
cut costs and save jobs at the same time, Congress as the overall controlling entity for
the base closure process, took a partial approach to both. They agreed to cut costs by
closing justifiable, unneeded, expensive bases while at the same time offering assistance
to those who were being directly affected.
It was a fair and reasonable approach to a delicate but necessary situation, and
the efforts and compromises of those who fought for years over this legislation was truly
worthwhile. In terms of overall success it should be regarded as a win-win-win
situation, even though some of those at locations where major bases are being closed
might not agree.
The enacting legislation was only 14 pages long and provided for a fair and
expedited method to evaluate what needed to be done. The process was fairly
66

straightforward and prescribed implementation measures that were generous but not
restrictive to the Secretary of Defense. It appears that the years of battles and dozens of
hearings held on the matter resulted in an appropriate and effective handling of this
issue. While not everyone was satisfied, which would have been a truly rare event in
politics, the majority were. After four years into the process, the closures seem to be
progressing steadily and smoothly with little criticism, which is a tribute to the apparent
evenhandedness of the whole effort. As with many programs, once started, they end up
being not as unfavorable as the opponents feared they would be. This appears to have
been the case with this one.
Of particular interest, it was refreshing to see Congress include the "all or
nothing" portion of the legislation that limited the back room political maneuvering of
which bases to add and which to cut once the recommended list was determined. In
general, the whole effort to compromise where deadlock existed before, offers hope that
ways can be found to overcome other significant governmental problems.
11.6 Recommendations For Further Study
Other useful areas that could be considered for further study on this topic would
include:
(a) what are the one-time costs and cost savings realized from the closures
during the 1988 process,
(b) what is the extent of economic adjustment assistance provided in the
aftermath of the 1988 closures,
(c) what effect did the 1988 closures have on federal civilian personnel,
(d) what actually happened to federal property in the disposal process versus
what was planned, and






From the view point of those who have the responsibility for military facilities,
such as the Naval Facilities Engineering Command and the Civil Engineer Corps
Officers for the Navy, they must ask themselves "where do we go from here? What do
we do now as we look towards future closures?" Typically, most officers and civilian
leaders are loyal to their immediate command, but in relation to this issue, this may not
always appear to be true.
Military officers who move every few years to different commands are
consciously being trained for the "big picture" throughout their careers. Therefore, what
position should the Public Works Officer for a base or the Staff Civil Engineer advising
an admiral take? Of course, the officer's immediate responsibility is to his or her
particular job, but what of the big picture? Perhaps, because of the their lack of roots,
or their logical, methodical approach to problems, or the subtle success of the Navy's
"big picture" training, the officer's answer might be to do what is best for the Navy over
what is best for his particular base or local staff. But this could be a very hard decision
to make when he has worked with these civilians for years and does not wish to see
them displaced.
Fortunately, or unfortunately, depending on the perspective, because this
situation has already occurred with the privatization of work on military facilities over
the last 10 years and, proven to be acceptable, the officer must recognize that such
things will continue to happen whether he as the facility professional objects to it or not.
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Is it not better to work with the process towards its fairest objective ends, and
are not we, as professionals, in a better position to do this than any others when it
comes to this business? Who better knows the Navy's infrastructure problems, the lack
of maintenance funding, the environmental clean-up headaches, the budget cuts and
shortfalls, the environmental compliance costs, the construction process, manpower and
ceiling point constraints, the availability and condition of land, facilities and airspace at
Navy installations (criteria 1), the ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and
future requirements at Navy facilities (criteria 2), the ability of facility infrastructure to
support forces, missions and personnel (criteria 7), and the environmental impact of
these changes (criteria 8)?
To work with the process means that the military and civilian leaders must do
their best in all these areas. They must look out for their personnel, since they are the
organization's most valuable asset. They must respond to command's interests with an
objective eye and carry out the Navy's mission requirements with compassion and
understanding of the local situation. Truly a delicate balance must be struck and, while
the Civil Engineer Corps Officers have been doing this throughout their careers, perhaps
it is time for them to improve their skills in this area.
Base closure is not totally subjective, it is based on objective measures such as
square feet of warehousing and liner feet of berthing. It is based on the degree to
which Military Construction and Maintenance of Real Property backlogs impair current
and future mission requirements. The effects of programmed environmental costs or
cost avoidance are a part of it, also. This is the arena in which the closure process
works. The Civil Engineer Corps Officer needs to understand it if he or she is to have
any affect on the outcome.
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12.2 What Factors To Look For That Affect Base Closure
The first step is to realize that different factors affect different functional
categories. What one looks for in submarine bases is not the same as for educational
training activities. There are 28 Navy functional categories as previously shown in Table
4-3. The place to start is by determining what category the installation of concern fits
into.
Next, the officer needs to realize that this is a two phase review. If the
installation can be excluded in Phase I, then it is usually dropped from further
evaluation until the next closure review year. If the facility is not excluded at the end
of Phase I, then it is looked at in more depth during Phase II, but even then the
majority are not recommended for closure.
During the first Phase, the Navy force -structure is converted into shore facility
requirements through use of the Shore Facility Planning System (SFPS). This will then
be compared to the existing facility inventory obtained from the Navy Facility Assets
Data Base (NFADB). Both of these steps are typically beyond the control or influence
of most base commands or next echelon staffs. Those functional categories without
excess capacity will usually be excluded from further review at this point, since it would
not make sense to close a base supporting an under strength category. The exception to
this is if your base falls within a geographical complex that is subject to closure (such as
Orlando or Philadelphia) where several bases are mutually supporting.
For bases in geographical complexes, the process is somewhat more confusing.
Certain installations are located to support key facilities and are interrelated or
considered to be "follower" facilities, such as regional hospitals and public works centers.
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If the key geographical base falls to closure, other bases and facilities, even in under
strength categories, may fall with it. This is based on the idea that without that key
facility the other installations in the geographic complex may not prove to be cost
effective or may have few areas to provide support to.
In those categories with excess capacity, all bases providing that support will be
judged against each other to see which ones do the best job relative to criteria 1-4. If
the bases are equally ranked after evaluation, those which have other positive assets:
tenants with critical missions, special physical attributes such as deep water berthing or
few air space restrictions, key geographical location, or strategic importance will
typically rank higher in comparison.
The important point here is to look at how much excess capacity does the
category have and what is the condition of the base relative to its competition to meet
the first four criteria? Further, does the facility have any special attributes or can it get
them?
At the end of Phase I, step 4, of the Base Structure Committee's review process
termed Base Evaluation, the committee moves to step 5, Exclusions from Further
Review. At this point, an overall color rating will be given to each base. Those with a
green rating will be dropped from further consideration, those with a yellow or red will
move on to Phase II for evaluation against all eight criteria, especially criteria 5, return
on investment.
Comparisons of those at the bottom of the rating process will determine which
bases are likely candidates for closure in order to bring the excess capacity numbers
down near zero. The worst of the worst will be the most likely choices. In the case
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study, those who know Construction Battalion Centers can readily see why CBC
Davisville was cut relative to CBCs Gulfport and Port Hueneme. The process only
evaluates bases against sister bases, not all bases. It is important to be better than the
competition in this regard. (13:51-75)
There are some criteria over which there is little influence at the local level such
as certain aspects of mission suitability and community support. However others such as
availability and quality of facilities, and quality of life (bachelor housing, recreational
areas, housing, medical facilities, etc.) are within the local command's capability to
influence, maybe not in the short term, but certainly in the long one. The key is to
know the rules of the game and to plan and budget effectively. At the same time the
concerned command must diplomatically interact with the local community and the
chain-of-command to make your base a model for others to follow, not a follower of
others. This is the strategy to keep the base, with all of its problems and uniqueness,
off the closure list. In this way both the people win (by keeping their jobs) and the
Navy is improved (by having an efficient and mission ready base), a win-win
proposition.
12.3 What to do if Your Base is Recommended for Closure
Closing a base is just as hard, if not harder a job, as working to keep one open.
It, unfortunately, receives less glory, endures poorer moral, and can leave the officer or
civilian involved with a positive sense of accomplishment in a negative sort of way. It
goes against the engineer's mentality of "building for a better tomorrow" and can be




Most of us know that adversity can be a better teacher than prosperity. This
task, while not necessarily building a physical structure can build that famed quality of
character and can require more leadership capabilities than one might realize. To work
with employees whose moral is at the bottom, to be objective about what is the best way
to deal with a particular closure problem, to be part of the interaction with the local
community who may be receiving all or parts of your facility, are just as important in
the development of a professional leader as being a Resident Officer in Charge of
Construction or an officer in a Construction Battalion and, harder to experience.
The decision to close a base may seem to waste facilities or be a poor judgment
on the part of someone "up the chain-of-command," but that individual "up the chain-
of-command" was probably an Ensign once and is now trying to make the best call for
the Navy from his or her viewpoint of the "big picture." Therefore, learning to support
the closure that may not seem right, while at the same time helping those affected by it,
is perhaps the most important quality that will be required in this process.
Other areas of importance include, environmental clean-up and restoration,
interaction with follow-on users about physical assets and their condition,
communication with civilian employees about what is happening and what assistance is
available to them, and property disposal. Many of the details in these areas will be
unfamiliar to the Civil Engineer Corps officer responsible for closing a base, but a base
closure is a unique opportunity in which to gain experience in them.
12.4 Conclusion
Whether the military or civilian engineer has the responsibility to prepare a base
against closure or to actually close one, either will offer unique experience opportunities.
The closure process can be influenced, but not by anything new or revolutionary.
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The way to work with it is through understanding what the rules are (to keep open or to
close) and by utilizing personnel, knowledge and dedication to doing the best job
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c.l A study of the domestic
base closure process.

